A different Middle East: How should Washington respond?
A very different Middle East will greet President-elect Donald J. Trump this month compared to the region he experienced during his first term. Syria is profoundly changed and presents both new problems and new opportunities. Iran is weakened, which is a good thing but needs to be played correctly to avoid a move toward nuclear breakout. Saudi Arabia is both more confident and less likely to sign on to an aggressive anti-Iran policy. The one major thing that has not changed is the unlikely prospect for settlement of the core issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which will present difficulties in any effort to extend the Abraham Accords. As usual in the Middle East, all of these issues are connected, so action on one will affect American prospects for success in others. The temptations to take advantage of Iran’s setbacks to push for regime change could involve the United States in a new Middle East adventure that is more likely to fail and even backfire. However, there are opportunities to advance American interests for a more stable and less conflictual Middle East, a Middle East that might not require the kind of intense US commitment we have seen over the last quarter-century. Such opportunities were not on the horizon a year ago.
Syria
President-elect Trump was right to imply in a social media post last month that Syria is not a core interest of the United States and does not justify escalated American military involvement. That does not mean that Washington should ignore what is happening there. While it has little leverage to shape the details of the new government in Damascus, the US needs to work to avoid worst-case scenarios. The two most likely and most dangerous are the revival of the Islamic State in eastern Syria and a confrontation between American allies Israel and Turkey in Syrian territory. The biggest arrows in Washington’s quiver are its relationship with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the mostly Kurdish militia it supports in eastern Syria; the fact that the SDF controls Syria’s oil-producing region; the 2,000 troops the US maintains in eastern Syria; and the American ability to lift the crushing economic sanctions that remain on Syria from the civil war period.
The ISIS threat is real. The number of ISIS attacks in Iraq and Syria during 2024 was on pace to double from 2023. The SDF maintains a prison system for ISIS fighters and a large, open-air detention camp for the families of those fighters in eastern Syria. Were SDF control of those facilities to end, the prospects for an ISIS revival would increase dramatically. The problem here is that Turkey, a patron of the rebels who brought down the Assad regime, sees the SDF as an extension of the Kurdish opposition in Turkey itself. Turkish-supported militias are now attacking SDF positions in northern and northeastern Syria, supported by the Turkish forces that occupy parts of Syria’s north. The Biden Administration negotiated a cease-fire between the combatants, but it has not held.
The SDF-Turkish issue is immediate. However, there is also the prospect of an Israeli-Turkish confrontation developing over the longer term. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been a persistent critic of the Israeli campaign in Gaza. The leader of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) force that now controls Damascus, Ahmad al-Sharaa, took the nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, “from the Golan.” Neither is positively disposed toward Israel and Israel’s continued occupation of Syrian territory. In response to the collapse of the Assad regime, Israeli forces have not only occupied the demilitarized zone in the Golan established after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. They have also now taken more Syrian territory beyond that zone. Turkey has already offered military support to the new Syrian government. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that Turkish and Israeli forces could one day face off near the Golan Heights.
The new American administration is well positioned to deal with both the immediate issue of SDF-Turkish antagonism and the longer-term tensions between Israel and Turkey. Turkey wants the new government in Damascus to succeed. Washington should use the lever of lifting sanctions to gain a Turkish commitment that it and its proxies will refrain from attacks on the SDF and work with all the concerned parties to find some resolution to the ISIS detainee issue. The new Syrian government will want to restore central authority over the oil-producing regions now under SDF control. That should only happen when the rights of the Kurdish minority in Syria are adequately recognized. What those rights will be is not of central importance to the United States. There is no need to support a quasi-independent Kurdish area as Washington did in Iraq. However, some agreement is required between the SDF leadership and the new government in Damascus that will stabilize Syrian domestic politics. At that point, when the SDF forces are integrated into a regional border patrol under central government supervision and Turkey has committed to not deploying forces near the Israeli border, the 2,000 American troops currently in Syria to support the SDF and monitor ISIS can be withdrawn. Washington needs to keep those troops there until a satisfactory solution to the ISIS problem is found.
Given its alliance relations with both Israel and Turkey, Washington can mediate the longer-term rules of engagement between them in Syria. A Turkish commitment not to deploy forces south of Damascus, combined with a Syrian government commitment to observe the 1974 Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement on the Golan, should be enough for Washington to broker the withdrawal of Israeli forces back to the original 1974 agreement lines.
Iran
The Iran that the first Trump administration faced in 2017 was riding high in the Middle East. Its allies and proxies were the dominant forces in the politics of four Arab countries — Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen — and its relationship with Hamas gave it a foothold in Palestinian politics. Iran is now on its heels. Its Syrian ally is gone. Hezbollah, its oldest and most successful regional proxy, has been dealt devastating blows by Israel. Its own direct military attacks on Israel were inconsequential, while Israel’s counter-attacks have destroyed much of Iran’s air defenses as well as key ballistic missile facilities, leaving it vulnerable to further strikes. Israel’s destructive campaign in Gaza has removed Hamas from the Arab-Israeli equation for some time. Tehran’s regional position is weaker than it has been at any time this century. It has also faced substantial domestic protests over the last six years, spurred both by economic hardships and by opposition to the government’s harsh social strictures, especially its measures against women.
It is natural in these circumstances that opponents of Iran will urge further pressure to try to bring down the Islamic regime, through strengthened sanctions, political pressure, military attack, or some combination thereof. Both Secretary of State-designate Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz, the incoming US national security advisor, have publicly urged tougher policies against Iran during their time in Congress. The first Trump administration’s stance toward Iran was based completely on sticks: a “maximum pressure” approach of harsh sanctions and withdrawal from the deal negotiated by the Obama administration that limited Iran’s nuclear weapons breakout capability. The temptation to rev up round two will be great. That tendency is likely to be amplified by the credible reports that Iran was plotting to assassinate candidate Trump as revenge for his killing of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani in 2020.
The “maximum pressure” temptation should be avoided, or at least matched with an overt willingness to engage Iran in negotiation. Just because Tehran is down, does not mean that it is out. The regime has weathered every domestic protest it has faced, including millions of people in the streets during the “Green Movement” of 2009. It retains a robust military and security sector that shows no signs of turning on its leaders or abandoning its posts, as the Syrian army did. Numerous American administrations have constructed policies aimed, if not overtly then at least substantively, at regime change in Tehran, including the first Trump administration. None succeeded.
It is not just that a determined policy of regime change faces long odds even at this moment of relative Iranian weakness; pursuing such a policy could easily backfire, leaving the United States worse off over the long term. Tehran still has considerable regional assets, including a dominant influence in Iraqi politics and a newly empowered proxy in the Houthis in Yemen. It could mount terrorist, cyber, and regional military attacks against American interests, including against Gulf oil exports, that are unthinkable in normal circumstances but entirely plausible if the United States were to commit itself to tearing down the clerical regime.
Worst of all, faced with an implacable American policy aimed at destabilizing its domestic rule, Iran would be much more likely to cross the nuclear threshold to achieve the ultimate deterrent. That step would undoubtedly lead to a war between Israel and Iran into which the United States would almost inevitably be drawn. Iranian attacks on American forces and bases in the Persian Gulf and on the oil facilities of America’s Gulf Arab allies would certainly follow.
Better that President-elect Trump follow his deal-making impulses and present the Iranian leadership with a path to agreement coupled with economic and political pressure and a clear statement that it is not seeking regime change. Such an agreement should reflect Iran’s weakened position in the region. The Obama administration’s negotiations on the Iran nuclear deal did not include Iran’s missile arsenal or its expansive policy of interference in the politics of regional countries. Both should be on the table this time, along with the nuclear issue. Iranian support for the Houthis in Yemen, who are launching missiles against Israel and attacking international shipping in the Red Sea, needs to end. Hezbollah must become a regular member of Lebanon’s (continuously dysfunctional) political system, not a militia that has its own foreign policy. Iran will not allow an Iraqi government to threaten it as Saddam Hussein did in the 1980s, but it has to respect Baghdad’s sovereignty and independence.
President-elect Trump talks tough on international politics but has frequently expressed his aversion to new wars in the Middle East. The best way to avoid that is through hard-headed but purposeful engagement with an Iranian regime that shows no sign of crumbling anytime in the near future. There are elements of the Iranian government, including the new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, who have publicly expressed their willingness for such engagement. Taking them up on it is a much less risky strategy than playing with the fire of the failed and discredited policy of regime change.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia was central to Trump’s Middle East policy in his first administration. His first overseas trip as president was to Riyadh. His son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) developed the kind of direct, “outside-of-normal-channels” relationship that must have driven the State Department to distraction. Saudi Arabia enthusiastically supported the “maximum pressure” policy against Iran and bought billions of dollars of American weapons. While Riyadh did not join Trump and Kushner’s crowning Middle East achievement, the Abraham Accords, it did not oppose close allies Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates from joining, and it developed its own, under-the-table relationship with Israel that promised eventual diplomatic recognition down the road. If the second Trump administration focuses on the same kinds of goals, it might expect the Saudis to be very supportive. That assumption would not be correct.
Just as the Middle East has changed since the first Trump term, so too has Saudi Arabia. When Trump originally took office, the leadership situation in Riyadh was still in flux. MBS used the support of the Trump administration to maneuver his rival, the then-Crown Prince Mohammed bin Naif, out of the line of succession in June 2017, shortly after Trump’s visit to Riyadh. The untested young leader, delegated day-to-day executive power by his ailing father, King Salman, was happy to follow the Trump line toward Iran. Now, seven years later, MBS is solidly in control of affairs in the kingdom. He has emphasized in recent years the need for regional stability as a necessary element of Vision 2030, his ambitious plan to fundamentally alter the Saudi economy away from its dependence on oil exports. He re-established diplomatic relations with Tehran in 2023, through Chinese mediation. While still leery of ultimate Iranian intentions, MBS is currently pursuing the opposite of a “maximum pressure” policy toward Tehran.
MBS’ turn toward engagement with Iran can be traced directly to Trump’s unwillingness to support Saudi Arabia after Iran’s audacious missile and drone attack on key Saudi oil facilities in September 2019. That attack came in reaction to the squeeze that “maximum pressure” was putting on the Iranian economy. Trump downplayed the seriousness of the attack, asserting that it was not America’s responsibility to respond, and took no proportionate military action against Iran. Saudi Arabia was shocked by this inaction. Both MBS’ rapprochement with Iran and his insistence in negotiations with the Biden administration that Saudi Arabia would recognize Israel only in exchange for a formal defense treaty between his country and the United States can be traced to Trump’s lack of response to the 2019 Iranian attack. Riyadh is unlikely to join a new “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran given this history.
The changes in the region also make it less likely that Saudi Arabia will agree to join the Abraham Accords and extend diplomatic recognition to Israel. The Saudi interest in relations with Israel had its basis in their joint view of Iran as a major threat and in the apparent decline in the salience of the Palestinian issue in Arab politics more generally. With Iran substantially weakened by the events of the past months, the Saudi need for a public relationship with Israel is diminished. The Gaza war has returned the Palestinian issue to the forefront of Arab public opinion, raising the domestic costs for the Saudis in any accommodation with Israel. In November 2024, reflecting this change, MBS described the Israeli campaign in Gaza as “genocide” and also warned Israel against an attack on Iran. This is not to suggest that Saudi foreign policy is controlled by public opinion. It is simply to acknowledge that Saudi leaders carry out a cost-benefit analysis on any policy change. The benefits of an open relationship with Israel are now reduced; the costs have increased. That calculus might change as regional realities develop. At present, however, pressing the Saudis to join the Abraham Accords is likely to be a fool’s errand.
Arab-Israeli issues
Given the crushing destruction visited upon Gaza by Israel after the heinous Oct. 7, 2023, attack by Hamas on Israeli civilians, and the intense diplomatic efforts and media attention that accompanied the fighting, the incoming Trump administration might be forgiven for thinking that the part of the Middle East that has changed the most is the Israeli-Palestinian arena. That would be a mistake. Despite the loss of life and enormous damage to infrastructure, the fundamental Israeli-Palestinian dynamic remains the same as it was before Oct. 7. The government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has no interest in the territorial compromises that would be required for the creation of a viable Palestinian state that any Palestinian interlocutor would accept. Israeli public opinion, in the wake of Oct. 7, has moved further away from support for a two-state solution. The Netanyahu government shows no interest in empowering the Palestinian Authority to assume the governance of Gaza, for fear that a unified Palestinian negotiating partner that supports a two-state solution would lead to international pressure on Israel to negotiate such a deal. Yet another American “peace plan” for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would meet the same fate as its predecessors. It is not worth the new administration’s time.
This is not to say that Washington can ignore the continuing conflict in Gaza or the Israeli military actions in Lebanon and Syria. Any hope of a stable Middle East requires an end to the Gaza fighting, which has gripped the attention of publics both in the region and beyond. There cannot be practical cooperation between Israel and Arab states while the carnage there continues. Gaza is also the pretext that the Houthis use to continue their missile attacks from Yemen, on Israel itself and on international shipping in the Red Sea. A cease-fire, including the return of hostages, is a necessary step toward regional stability, but it is unlikely to create momentum toward a more sustainable political solution. The humanitarian work to be done in Gaza is worthwhile in and of itself but should not be confused with a diplomatic process toward settlement of the larger issue between Israel and the Palestinians. That is just not in the cards given the realities of Israeli politics.
It is on the Syrian and Lebanese fronts that the United States can use its relationship with Israel to play a more constructive political role. As discussed above, Washington can bargain with Turkey and the new Syrian government from a position of strength in part because only it can induce the Israelis to withdraw from their newly occupied (as opposed to their decades-long occupied) Syrian territories. With Hezbollah’s leadership decimated, the US should work with Arab partners and France to constitute a new Lebanese government that will begin to assert its sovereignty over the whole of the country and enforce the cease-fire deal with Israel agreed to in November 2024. Similarly, only Washington has the clout to get the Israelis to live up to their part of that bargain and eventually withdraw from Lebanese territory. Success on these fronts would contribute to regional stability, though they would not solve the core issues that remain in the Arab-Israeli conflict — broader Arab recognition of Israel, Israeli recognition of Palestinian self-determination, and Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories. Unfortunately, the political horizon for addressing those core issues seems to be in the distant future.
Conclusion
Like its most recent Democratic predecessors, and like its first iteration, this new Trump administration comes to office looking to reduce the intense focus on the Middle East that has characterized American foreign and military policy since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. That is smart. The recent changes in the region hold out the prospect that the US can devote fewer resources and shoulder fewer tasks to ensure its interests in the region, but only if it plays its cards right. That does not mean abandoning those cards, or the region itself. It remains too important for America’s global role. It means using American leverage to achieve aims that will bring our interests and our commitments better into alignment.
Doing so means following three simple but difficult rules. Rule one is to avoid the trap of a regime change policy toward Iran, which can only drag the administration into a new round of crisis and war. Rule two is to avoid the trap of making a priority of a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli issue, which can only sap energies and divert attention from more achievable goals. Rule three is to remember that a stable Middle East requires governments that can actually govern their societies and control their territories, not necessarily governments that could join the “club of democracies.” With modest goals, realistic expectations, and steady diplomacy the incoming second Trump administration could leave the Middle East in much better shape than it is finding it.
F. Gregory Gause, III, is a Visiting Scholar at the Middle East Institute. He is also a professor emeritus of international affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University.
Photo by Emin Sansar/Anadolu via Getty Images
The Middle East Institute (MEI) is an independent, non-partisan, non-for-profit, educational organization. It does not engage in advocacy and its scholars’ opinions are their own. MEI welcomes financial donations, but retains sole editorial control over its work and its publications reflect only the authors’ views. For a listing of MEI donors, please click here.
Distribution channels: Politics
Legal Disclaimer:
EIN Presswire provides this news content "as is" without warranty of any kind. We do not accept any responsibility or liability for the accuracy, content, images, videos, licenses, completeness, legality, or reliability of the information contained in this article. If you have any complaints or copyright issues related to this article, kindly contact the author above.
Submit your press release